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Abstract   
Modernization theory predicts rising education should increase assortative mating by education 
and decrease sorting by race.  Recent research suggests effects of educational expansion depend 
on contextual factors such as economic development.  Using log-linear and log multiplicative 
models of male household heads ages 36 to 75 in the 1940 U.S. census data, the first census with 
educational attainment information, I investigate how educational assortative mating changed 
with one instance of educational expansion: early U.S. compulsory school attendance laws.  To 
improve on existing research and distinguish effects of expansion from changes due to particular 
years or cohorts, I capitalize on state variation in the timing of these compulsory laws (which 
ranged from 1852 to 1918).  Aggregate results suggest compulsory laws had minimal impact on 
assortative mating.  However, separate analyses by region (and supplemental analyses by race) 
reveal that assortative mating by education decreased with the laws in the South, but increased in 
the North.  Whether due to economic, legal, political, or other differences, results suggest the 
implications of educational expansion for marital sorting depend on context.  Contemporary 









Inequality has grown in recent decades (Piketty 2014; Keister 2000; Piketty and Saez 
2003; Harrison and Bluestone 1988; Morris and Western 1999) with implications for children 
and future generations (Duncan and Murnane 2011; Ermisch et al. 2012; Conley 2001; Yeung 
and Conley 2008).  Partly due to diverging trends in marital patterns between parents with high 
and low levels of education, McLanahan (2004) notes the growing gap in resources and 
outcomes for children.  As returns to education rise (Goldin and Katz 2008), children of parents 
with low levels of education are particularly marginalized.  Perhaps increasing education among 
disadvantaged youth could help change marital patterns to reduce child inequality.   
In January 2012, President Obama called for states to extend compulsory schooling to 
age 18.  Evidence from 13 countries suggests educational expansion is associated with increased 
educational assortative mating1 (Blossfeld and Timm 2003; Blossfeld and Drobnic 2001).  Much 
of this expansion, however, occurred at the post-secondary level.  Would expansion at the 
bottom of the educational distribution yield similar effects on assortative mating? 
Because a compulsory school extension would affect those most likely to drop out of 
school, lengthened compulsory schooling would increase educational attainment most among 
disadvantaged and minority youth (Angrist and Krueger 1991; Oreopoulos et al. 2006; 
Oreopoulos 2006).  How might this type of educational expansion – raising the minimum – 
affect educational assortative mating?   
Research on the equalizing effects of education typically focuses on the labor market 
(Hout 1988; Torche 2011; Brand and Xie 2010).  Yet educational expansion may have important 
marital implications as well.  Marital patterns play a central – and arguably increasing – role in 
                                                            




inequality (Wu and Wolfe 2001; Ellwood and Jencks 2004; Looney and Greenstone 2012; 
Thompson 2013; Greenwood et al. 2014).  Economic standing explains much marital inequality 
(Sweeney 2002; Goldstein and Kenney 2001; Oppenheimer et al. 1997; Lloyd and South 1996; 
Goldscheider and Waite 1986), but certain aspects of economic standing, such as education, may 
be more amenable to policy change than others.  If educational expansion among disadvantaged 
or minority youth increases interaction among children from various class and racial 
backgrounds (Rauscher 2014), then extended compulsory schooling could increase marital 
sorting on education and reduce sorting on class, race, or ethnicity (Blossfeld and Timm 2003).  
Coupled with increased education for those at the bottom of the distribution, this pattern of 
marital effects could reduce childhood inequality (McLanahan 2004).  Alternatively, extended 
education for disadvantaged youth may encourage upper class youth to stay in school longer, 
leaving educational assortative mating largely unchanged.  Additional research is required in 
order to understand the potential marital implications of expanded education for disadvantaged 
youth.   
One difficulty of establishing a causal relationship between education and assortative 
mating is ruling out alternative explanations.  For example, rising demand for educated workers 
may have encouraged 20th century trends of increasing educational attainment and educational 
sorting in the marriage market due to the attractiveness of partners with high earning potential.  
Because most studies of assortative mating rely on cohort change (e.g., Blossfeld and Timm 
2003; Kalmijn 1991; Rosenfeld 2008), existing demographic research has difficulty 
distinguishing between educational effects and cohort or other changes.  In other words, existing 
research is largely descriptive.  Establishing a causal estimate of the relationship requires a 
change in education that is independent of such temporal or cohort changes.   
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To partially address these methodological difficulties, I capitalize on state variation in the 
timing of early U.S. compulsory school attendance laws – the first law in each state requiring 
children in a given age range to attend school for a minimum number of weeks each year.  By 
using these laws, I move beyond descriptive techniques and estimate effects on educational 
assortative mating.  Because the timing of these laws varied across states, results approach a 
causal estimate and do not simply reflect changes particular to specific years or cohorts.   
Early compulsory laws were passed by states in the late 1800s and early 1900s.  Effects 
of extended compulsory schooling may certainly differ today, but there are several motivations 
to study effects of early laws.  First, recent research finds evidence that educational sorting in the 
U.S. remained relatively stable despite educational expansion (Timm et al. 2003), but increased 
in other countries (Blossfeld and Timm 2003).  Perhaps education held more power to influence 
sorting in the U.S. at the turn of the century, when educational attainment was lower, the timing 
of marriage and economic independence depended less on schooling, and traditional gender roles 
were stronger.  Second, economic inequality is high today, mirroring levels experienced around 
the turn of the century (Piketty and Saez 2003; Alvaredo et al. 2013).  If educational effects on 
marital sorting depend on inequality, the late 1800s and early 1900s offer a good comparison for 
today.  Third, contemporary expansion is largely at the post-secondary level, but extended 
compulsory education (suggested by President Obama) would primarily influence low income 
and minority youth at the bottom of the distribution, with less than a high school degree.  
Similarly, compulsory laws at the turn of the century affected lower class and minority youth at 
the bottom of the distribution, who were not already attending school (Rauscher 2014).  Finally, 
state variation in the timing of the laws offers a unique opportunity to distinguish effects of 
educational expansion from cohort change. 
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Capitalizing on this opportunity and the useful comparisons it offers for contemporary 
debates, I ask whether early U.S. compulsory school attendance laws – which increased 
educational equality by race and class background – influenced the strength of spousal similarity 
by education.  Below I provide a brief overview of the laws, theoretical and empirical 
background, details about data and methods, results, and a discussion including potential 
theoretical and contemporary implications. 
 
Early Compulsory Education Laws: A Brief Overview 
Compulsory school attendance laws began with Massachusetts in 1852.  Other states in 
New England and the North followed more quickly than the South, but by 1918 (when 
Mississippi passed the law) all states had made attendance compulsory.2  Compulsory laws 
aimed to achieve universal school attendance and were primarily directed at lower class and 
immigrant families who did not already send their children to school.  For example, the 
Commissioner of Education (1891:493) reported, “It must be borne in mind that the law applies 
to children of tender years, whose right it is to have schooling.  If the misfortune or shiftlessness 
of parents has resulted in poverty, shall the burden of this fall upon young children?”  Opposition 
to compulsory schooling reportedly came “from the lawless and criminal classes; from the idle 
and shiftless; from those who take no interest in the education of their children, or care nothing 
for them but to get work out of them; and, of course, from those who have felt the penalties of 
the law” (1891: 520).  Compulsory schooling laws aimed to override “irresponsible” parents and 
increase attendance among lower class and immigrant youth (Perrin 1896; Moore 1902). 
                                                            
2 The year school attendance became compulsory in each state is shown in supplementary Table S1. 
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 Despite these efforts, compulsory laws were not perfectly enforced.  By introducing 
potential punishments for non-attendance, however, they encouraged attendance.  Consistent 
with the targeting of lower class youth, evidence suggests the laws increased educational equality 
by race and social class background, boosting attendance and attainment most among lower class 
and minority youth (Rauscher 2014).  By expanding who attended school, theory suggests the 
compulsory laws should also have increased exposure among children from varying class and 
racial backgrounds. 
 
Empirical and Theoretical Background 
Modernization Theory 
According to industrialization or modernization theory, as a society modernizes ascribed 
characteristics such as race become less important for life chances while achieved characteristics 
become more important (Treiman 1970).  Educational expansion is a central feature of 
industrialization, meeting the growing demand for skilled and socialized workers.  To remain 
competitive, industrialization theory suggests employers in a modernizing society increasingly 
rely on educational achievement rather than ascribed characteristics.  Potential marriage partners 
may similarly rely increasingly on behavioral rather than ascribed characteristics.  According to 
modernization theory, educational expansion should increase social exposure (and therefore 
intermarriage) among individuals from different socioeconomic and racial backgrounds 
(Rosenfeld 2008).  
  However, as more youth attend school and as that education trumps ascribed 
characteristics in determining earning potential, modernization theory also suggests individuals 
on the marriage market should rationally value the education (and therefore earning power) of a 
potential spouse more than his or her class or race.  In other words, modernization theory 
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suggests early compulsory schooling laws should raise the earning potential of non-white and 
lower class youth (those most affected by the laws) while also increasing their exposure to 
potential partners from other social backgrounds (Rosenfeld 2008), thereby reducing assortative 
mating by race and class but increasing educational sorting.  Consistent with modernization 
theory, therefore, Hypothesis 1 is that early compulsory laws should increase marital sorting by 
education level. 
Spousal similarity has implications for inequality and social boundaries (Schwartz 2013; 
Kalmijn 1998).  By pooling resources, spousal similarity can increase income disparities between 
households (Schwartz 2013; Burtless 1999).  In this way, assortative mating could strengthen the 
transmission of inequality across generations (Fernandez and Rogerson 2001; Kremer 1997).  In 
addition, racial, ethnic, or religious similarity of spouses maintains social segregation along these 
boundaries, preventing integration and perhaps between-group understanding (Kalmijn 1998; 
Johnson 1980).   
Given its importance for inequality, a great deal of research investigates how the strength 
of assortative mating varies across countries and over time, often implicitly or explicitly testing 
modernization theory (Kalmijn 1991; Rosenfeld 2008; Ultee and Luijkx 1990; Blossfeld 2009).  
For example, in support of industrialization theory, Kalmijn (1991) finds that education became 
increasingly important for spousal selection in the 20th century U.S., while religion became less 
important.  Other research finds that educational expansion is associated with increased 
educational assortative mating in multiple countries (Blossfeld and Timm 2003). 
Despite its theoretical appeal, however, research is not always consistent with 
modernization theory.  For example, Rosenfeld (2008) finds relatively stable marital sorting by 
education and little relationship between education and marital sorting by race over time.  
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Similarly, reviews of the literature note that cross-national trends in educational assortative 
mating are not always consistent with modernization theory (Schwartz 2013; Blossfeld 2009).  In 
particular, changes over time in the strength of educational assortative mating depend on 
education level (Schwartz and Mare 2005), measurement choices (Hou and Myles 2008; Wong 
2003), or context (Blossfeld and Timm 2003).   
The mixed evidence for modernization theory could reflect different effects depending on 
the level at which education expands.  For example, expansion at the top of the educational 
distribution may carry different implications for assortative mating than expansion at the bottom 
of the distribution.    
 
Level of Education 
Schwartz and Mare (2005) find intriguing evidence that the strength of educational 
sorting by level of education varies over time.  Specifically, they find that rising educational 
homogamy in the 1960s reflected an increased likelihood of college graduates to marry each 
other.  From the 1970s, however, they find increased educational sorting at both the top and 
bottom of the distribution, with greater intermarriage at the middle of the distribution (i.e. 
between high school graduates and those with some college).  In a similar vein, cross-national 
research finds that trends in educational homogamy depend on the number of educational levels 
and the educational distribution in each country (Blossfeld and Timms 2003).   
Thus, it seems likely that effects of educational expansion may differ depending on the 
level of education that expands, the proportion of people with that level, the overall distribution 
of education, and other contextual factors.  Therefore, if extended contemporary compulsory 
schooling laws increased educational attainment at the bottom of the distribution, effects on 
assortative mating may differ from effects of post-secondary expansion.   
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Existing research largely focuses on trends associated with expansion at the post-
secondary level (Blossfeld and Timms 2003).  Early compulsory schooling laws offer a unique 
opportunity to better understand the potential consequences of expansion at the bottom of the 
distribution.  While the historical context certainly differs from the contemporary context, this 
analysis provides useful similarities (high inequality and rapid economic change) and allows the 




Compulsory effects on marriage markets could differ depending on context (Blossfeld 
and Timm 2003).  For example, according to modernization theory, education should hold more 
importance in more industrialized contexts, such as the Northern U.S. around the turn of the 
century.  If the value of education was higher in the industrialized North, educational expansion 
may have increased educational homogamy there while leaving it relatively unchanged in the 
more agricultural and traditional South.  Alternatively, segregation or limited availability of 
school spots3 despite the compulsory laws (Walters 2000) may have paradoxically maintained 
racial homogamy and limited educational homogamy in the South.  Hypothesis 2 therefore 
suggests that early compulsory laws should increase educational assortative mating in the North, 
but have no effect or reduce it in the less developed South.   
Another potential explanation for contextual variation is that the function of education 
may have differed in the two contexts.  As several authors argue, education may have served 
capitalist and elite interests in industrialized areas by reproducing inequality, preparing working 
class youth for obedience and elite youth for power (Bowles and Gintis 1976; Spring 1972; Field 
                                                            
3 Segregation would prevent interaction among social groups. Limited availability of school spots would maintain 
educational inequality, limiting social exposure among groups and returns to education for disadvantaged youth. 
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1976; Cookson and Persell 1985; MacLeod 1995).  If education emphasized social position in 
the more industrialized North, compulsory laws in those states may have strengthened assortative 
mating on ascribed characteristics.  In contrast, educational expansion may encourage economic 
development and rationalization in less developed contexts (Lutz et al. 2008; Krueger and 
Lindahl 2001; Barro 2001, 1997), potentially lowering social boundaries.  Consistent with these 
scenarios, Hypothesis 3 suggests compulsory laws should reduce racial assortative mating in the 
less developed South, but increase it in the North.  By comparing results in two contexts within 
the same country, this study cannot tease apart the relative importance of various factors, but 
does provide additional information about contextual factors that may moderate effects of 
educational expansion. 
While a great deal of research focuses on the latter half of the 20th century (Timm et al. 
2003; Schwartz and Mare 2005), studying early compulsory attendance laws shifts to an early 
stage of U.S. economic development.  Smits et al. (1998) suggest economic development may be 
associated with weakening educational assortative mating at later stages of development, but 
rising educational homogamy at earlier stages.  Thus, examination of earlier cohorts makes 
results more likely to support modernization theory.  By focusing on earlier expansion, therefore, 
this study sets up a stronger test of modernization theory than is generally possible in more 
recent research.   
Coupled with evidence that assortative mating is more complex than modernization 
theory suggests (Smits et al. 1998), the above discussion of the importance of education level 
and context suggest alternative methods and more detailed theories may be required to 





While a great deal of research investigates how the strength of assortative mating varies 
over time, less research has identified specific factors that strengthen or weaken homogamy 
(Smits et al. 1998).  The empirical focus on trends limits the ability to identify specific factors 
that strengthen or weaken assortative mating (Smits et al. 1998).  Thus, even if researchers 
achieved a consensus about trends in homogamy, we would not know what drove those trends.  
Changes could reflect modernization, economic growth, educational expansion, or other factors.   
Because existing research documents trends in education and marital sorting, it cannot 
distinguish effects of education from cohort effects or other changes over time.  For example, 
rising returns to schooling could drive both rising education levels and greater educational 
similarity of spouses.  Cohorts raised during an economic recession could have both lower 
education levels and less assortative mating for reasons other than their educational attainment. 
Moving beyond descriptive research requires distinguishing effects of educational 
expansion from changes that occurred in particular cohorts or years.  To achieve this distinction, 
I capitalize on state variation in the timing of compulsory schooling laws.  Pooling across states, 
I compare those within a narrow window on either side of the compulsory cutoff.  Because these 
cutoffs occur in multiple years, differences do not represent changes in a particular time period 
or cohort.  Thus, this method provides an estimate of the effect of educational expansion distinct 
from changes that occurred in particular years or cohorts.  At the individual level, children could 
not opt into or out of compulsory assignment, which depended on state of residence and age at 
the time of the law.   
Compulsory schooling laws have been used as a natural experiment in a variety of 
studies, including those estimating effects of education on longevity (Lleras-Muney 2005), 
earnings (Angrist and Krueger 1991; Oreopoulos 2006), child educational outcomes (Oreopoulos 
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et al. 2006), and fertility (Puerta 2009).  Many of these analyses estimate the effect of 
compulsory assignment in the context of a multivariate instrumental variable regression.  
However, two criticisms of this approach to using compulsory laws as a natural experiment are 
that it: 1) is biased when the first stage (e.g., effect of the compulsory law on schooling) is weak; 
and 2) answers a narrow question and estimates the local average treatment effect for a limited 
group who is influenced by the laws (Angrist and Pischke 2009).  This analysis, however, is 
explicitly interested in the effect of the laws on disadvantaged youth who are most affected by 
the laws.  Furthermore, previous research shows a significant effect of early compulsory laws on 
schooling (Rauscher 2014; Puerta 2009).  Most importantly, the approach used here represents 
an improvement over descriptive methods while maintaining the benefits of log linear models. 
The field of assortative mating has long used log linear models (Johnson 1980).  To 
maintain comparability with existing research, I use log multiplicative models to compare the 
strength of association by compulsory assignment category within a narrow window of the 
compulsory cutoff (discussed in more detail in the methods section).  While the comparison 
groups are similar to those used in an instrumental variable analysis, this approach does not 
include controls and provides the equivalent of a reduced form (or intent-to-treat) estimate of the 
effect of compulsory assignment on assortative mating.     
To summarize the above review, research offers mixed support for the ability of 
modernization theory to explain changes in assortative mating or its relationship with education.  
However, this could reflect a focus on expansion at higher levels of education, the particular time 
and context studied, or reliance on associational methods, among other things.  By investigating 
effects of early compulsory laws, this study contributes to existing research in several ways.  
First, it investigates the consequences of expansion at the bottom of the educational distribution, 
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the section most relevant for contemporary discussions of extended compulsory schooling.  
Second, it investigates effects of expansion around the turn of the century, earlier than most 
existing research, when inequality was high, the timing of marriage and economic independence 
depended less on schooling, and traditional gender roles were stronger.  Third, it compares 
results in two contexts within the same country – the U.S. North and South – to offer additional 
evidence about which contextual factors may moderate the relationship between educational 
expansion and assortative mating.  Fourth, it improves on descriptive research by providing an 
estimate of the effect of an early instance of educational expansion (compulsory schooling laws) 
on assortative mating net of specific year or cohort effects.  By focusing on the effects of early 
educational expansion on disadvantaged youth in two contexts within the U.S., this study sets up 
a strong test of modernization theory.  Results of this analysis will provide more information 
about the contexts in which modernization theory might explain assortative mating patterns. 
 
Data and Methods 
Data 
The first U.S. census with educational attainment information was 1940.  Individual 1940 
census data from IPUMS provide large sample sizes, with educational attainment for each 
household head as well as their spouse for those currently married.  The sample is limited to 
household heads who were married in 1940 and who were within a narrow window of the 
compulsory assignment cutoff.  That is, I include individuals who either just missed being 
required to attend school (i.e. were one to five years beyond the age legally required to attend 
school) or who were up to ten years beneath the compulsory cutoff (i.e. were required to attend 
school for up to ten years).  To insure that each cohort includes some individuals required and 
not required to attend school, the sample is limited to those ages 36 to 75 in 1940.  This excludes 
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individuals born after 1904, who were school-age after the last state made attendance required 
and were therefore all required to attend school.  This study therefore includes individuals born 
between 1865 and 1904. 
Unfortunately, spousal information is not available for widowed, divorced, or deceased 
individuals, which could bias results.  For example, non-homogamous marriages may be more 
likely to dissolve (Tzeng 1992) or individuals required to attend school may live longer (Lleras-
Muney 2005).  While I cannot fully address these potential concerns, limiting the sample to 
individuals within five or ten years on each side of the compulsory cutoff reduces concern about 
bias due to differential mortality.  In addition, divorce was rare in the early 1900s and therefore 
has limited ability to bias results.  As shown in Table S2, only 1% of those who would otherwise 
appear in the sample were divorced, 4% were widowed or never married, and 91% were married.   
Table 1 provides summary statistics.  Comparing the proportion required to attend school 
in Tables 1 and S2 further reduces concern.  Whether including or excluding individuals who 
were not married in 1940, the proportion required to attend school is 67%.   
[Table 1] 
Combining state of birth, year of compulsory education law, ages at which the state law 
required attendance, and birth year, compulsory assignment is a dummy variable that indicates 
whether an individual was ever school age after the law passed.4  In most states, compulsory 
                                                            
4 The compulsory assignment indicator is based on state of birth. Individuals may not have remained in their birth 
state throughout the time they were school-age, which would introduce error to the compulsory assignment measure 
and increase the likelihood of underestimating effects if this migration were random with respect to marital sorting 
and compulsory assignment. If, however, families were more likely to move if their child was required to attend 
school then the direction of the bias would depend on the characteristics of those families and whether those 
children are likely to partner with more or less similar spouses. I take two steps to reduce concern about this 
potential bias. First, I repeat analyses using a compulsory assignment indicator based on current state of residence 
and find similar results. This compulsory assignment measure is less desirable than that used in the main analysis 
because education could encourage migration to another state (e.g., for job or other opportunities), which could 
mediate effects of compulsory attendance on marital sorting. Second, I use IPUMS Linked Representative Samples 
to estimate the prevalence of inter-state migration among families with children in the late 1800s and compare 
migrant and non-migrant families with children on several demographic measures. Presented in Table S3, the data 
14 
 
laws required attendance for children ages 8 to 14 (Steinhilber and Sokolowski 1966), but a few 
states required attendance until age 15 (Maine, Rhode Island, Wisconsin) or age 16 (Connecticut, 
Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wyoming).  In some cases, the law went into effect the year after it 
was passed.  Even when the law went into effect the year it passed, many children would be a 
year older by the start of the next school year.  Therefore, in creating the indicator for 
compulsory assignment, individuals who were the maximum age at which attendance was 
required when the law was passed are not considered part of the compulsory group.  Everyone 
one year below the maximum age at the time of the law is included in the compulsory group 
because they were legally required to attend school for at least one school term.5    
Table 1 includes means for the whole sample as well as separately by compulsory 
category, including those within five years beyond the compulsory cutoff who were never 
required to attend school, those required to attend who were 1 to 5 years beneath the cutoff, and 
those required to attend who were 6 to 10 years beneath the cutoff.  Comparisons reveal that age 
and birth year are similar across compulsory categories.  
Education level ranges from one to five.  Based on highest grade of schooling completed, 
level one includes those who did not complete first grade, level two includes those who 
completed at least first but less than eighth grade, three includes those who completed eighth 
grade, four includes more than eighth but less than twelfth grade,  and five includes those who 
completed at least twelfth grade.  Spouse education level is measured using the same categories.  
Table 2 shows the percentage of individuals and spouses falling in each category.  Although the 
                                                            
are consistent with limited potential bias due to selective migration. Most importantly, inter-state migration among 
families with children is independent of the timing of state compulsory schooling laws. 
5 Another reason for choosing this cutoff, historians have noted that early compulsory laws were poorly enforced 
and employment was common and even encouraged among older youth around age 13 or 14 (Tyack 1974). 
Compulsory laws are therefore more likely to influence younger children under the maximum age required at the 
time of the law, when social norms and any child labor laws may have restricted employment.  
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highest percentage falls in category two, the number of observations who have completed each 
grade in that level (first through seventh) is fairly evenly divided, making it difficult to 
disaggregate this category.  In contrast, approximately 28% of individuals completed 8th grade 
alone, so I treat 8th grade as a separate category.   
[Table 2] 
Table 2 shows that spouse education level is slightly higher than individual education 
level.  This suggests that, on average, men may have married spouses with slightly higher 
education levels than their own in the early 1900s.  This difference highlights a potential 
complication of examining a dyadic outcome (i.e. similarity of married couples).  Although 
compulsory laws influenced school attendance rates and educational attainment of both men and 
women, research suggests the effects in some cases differed by gender (Rauscher 2014).  Log-
linear and log multiplicative models control for marginal distributions, meaning they account for 
potential gender differences in the distribution of education.  Moreover, while results do not 
generalize to individual outcomes, the aim of this paper is to understand implications for 
assortative mating. 
Returning to Table 1, contrary to age and birth year, education level varies by 
compulsory category.  As should be the case, education level is higher among those required to 
attend for longer.  Spouse’s education also increases across compulsory category.  The 
proportion whose spouse has a higher level of education remains stable across compulsory 
category.  However, the proportion with a less educated spouse slightly increases while the 
proportion with a similarly educated spouse (educational homogamy) slightly decreases among 






State differences in the timing of compulsory school attendance laws provide variation 
across cohorts in whether an individual was required to attend school or not.  An individual born 
in 1864, for example, would have been 10 years old when Kansas required school attendance, 
but 23 years old when Nebraska required attendance.  He would have been required to attend 
school if he lived in Kansas, but not if he lived in Nebraska. 
While assortative mating was likely changing over time regardless of compulsory laws, I 
focus on a narrow window of birth cohorts on each side of the compulsory assignment cutoff.  
Within that narrow window, estimated effects of compulsory assignment rest on the assumption 
that individuals are similar except for whether or not they were required to attend school.  
Because state differences in timing ensure cohort variation in compulsory assignment, cohort-
specific differences (such as war or economic recession) should not bias estimates.6   
The analysis involves three steps.  First, I compare the proportion married to a similarly 
educated spouse across compulsory categories.  This paints a rough picture of how homogamy 
may have changed with compulsory laws.  Second, I use log linear models to determine the 
model that best fits the aggregate distribution (combined data across compulsory categories and 
regions).  Third, to provide a more detailed understanding, I use log multiplicative models to 
analyze the three-way relationship between individual education (5 categories), spouse’s 
education (5 categories), and compulsory assignment category (3 categories).  These models 
allow flexible analysis of spousal similarity, controlling for marginal distributions.  In addition, I 
                                                            
6 A potential concern is that estimates could simply reflect trends in assortative mating. As modernization theory 
suggests, educational assortative mating may have been increasing across cohorts with economic development 
(Smits et al. 1998). Because individuals required to attend school were necessarily in later cohorts than those never 
required to attend, estimates could simply reflect these trends. This scenario makes results more likely to support 
modernization theory, offering a stronger test of that theory. The narrow cohort window on either side of the 




disaggregate the data by region (North and South) and compare results by region to test 
hypotheses two and three.   
In step two, I compare fit statistics across multiple models to choose the specification that 
best captures the relationship between individual and spouse characteristics.  Bayesian 
information criteria (BIC), Akaike information criteria (AIC), and deviance measures are used to 
select the model best balancing data fit and parsimony (Raftery 1986; 1995).  BIC alone is 
insufficient because it may overvalue parsimony or simpler models (Weakliem 1999).  While log 
linear models are appealing because of their flexibility, log multiplicative (also called uniform 
difference) models offer a more parsimonious estimate of whether the strength of assortative 
mating varies by compulsory category (Xie 1992; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992).  These models 
classify individual education by spouse’s education by compulsory category, hypothesizing that 
spousal similarity is constant regardless of compulsory assignment.  The log multiplicative model 
can be written: 










iijkF φψττττττ=  
where theτ  parameters control for marginal effects for rows (R, individual education category), 
columns (C, spouse’s education category), and layers (L, compulsory category), and their two-
way interactions to best predict the number of observations in each individual-spouse-layer 
category (Powers and Xie 2008:110-1).  The φ  parameters (of primary interest) measure the 
strength of individual-spouse association (assortative mating) by compulsory category.  The local 
log odds of having a spouse in education category j given individual category i for compulsory 
group k is calculated as: 




Supplemental Analyses of Racial Assortative Mating 
Beyond effects on educational homogamy, modernization theory suggests educational 
expansion should also reduce assortative mating on ascribed characteristics such as race.  As a 
further test of modernization theory, I therefore present supplementary analyses of racial 
assortative mating.  Because of the small proportion of interracial marriages at the time, 
however, this information is merely suggestive and results should be interpreted with caution.  
Analyses follow the same procedures described above, using the same 1940 census data but 
replacing educational category with racial category.7 
As shown in Table 1, the proportion of white individuals and spouses increases across 
compulsory categories.  The proportion with a same race spouse rounds to 100% in all 
categories.  This limits variation for analyses of assortative mating by race, making models that 
fit the diagonal cells more likely to provide the best fit for the data.  Nevertheless, there is a 
small amount of variation and log linear models are equipped to deal with small cell values, 
provided the overall sample size is large enough.  Log linear models require a sample size at 
least five times the number of cells.  Race is specified in three categories: white, black, and 
Native American or Asian.  The table of individual race (3 categories) by spouse race (3 
categories) by compulsory category (3 categories) holds 27 cells, yielding a minimum sample 
size of 135.  The sample used here is 40,697, providing more than enough cases.  Therefore, 
while higher rates of interracial marriage might provide more information, log linear models are 
equipped to deal with such situations.  One limitation of the small number of racial categories, 
however, is that there are fewer degrees of freedom for the analysis of racial sorting.  Therefore, 
fewer models are applicable or suitable for analysis of racial assortative mating. 
                                                            
7 Supplemental analyses of 1910-1930 census data yield similar results for assortative mating by race. Educational 




Results    
Educational Assortative Mating 
Table 3 compares the proportion of men married to a spouse with the same education 
level – among those in all states as well as in the North and South.  Figure 1 illustrates these 
statistics for men in all states, showing that the proportion married to a spouse with a similar 
education level declines across compulsory categories (from 58% to 56%), while the proportion 
married to a spouse with a lower level of education increases (from 15% to 17%).  The 
proportion married to a spouse with higher education is consistently higher than the proportion 
married to a less educated spouse, but this figure remains constant across compulsory categories 
(27%).  At the same time, Table 3 suggests there may be regional differences.  In the South, 
educational homogamy decreases across compulsory category, while it tends to increase in the 
North.  Based on these mean comparisons, there appear to be changes in assortative mating with 
the compulsory laws and these changes may vary by region.   
[Table 3, Figure 1] 
To better understand the effects of the laws, Table 4 presents results of log-linear 
regression analyses of aggregate data (collapsed by compulsory category and region).  I compare 
fit statistics across a variety of models (including independence, row effects, column effects, 
uniform association, quasi-symmetry, crossings, and row-column effects) to determine which 
best captures educational assortative mating patterns.  Comparing deviance, BIC, and AIC 
statistics clearly shows that the quasi-symmetry model best fits the distribution.  I therefore use 
this model to examine variation in the strength of assortative mating by compulsory category.8 
                                                            
8 The quasi-symmetry model allows marginal distributions to vary, while the distribution is constrained to be 
symmetric across the diagonal and each diagonal cell (where individual and spouse education level is equal) is 
specified. The quasi-symmetry model is also the best-fitting log-multiplicative model in the disaggregated data, so 
results from other models are not presented. 
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[Tables 4 and 5] 
Table 5 presents the results of log-multiplicative analyses, which measure the strength of 
assortative mating by education across compulsory categories.  Null effect models restrict the 
strength of spousal similarity to be the same across compulsory categories, while the 
multiplicative effect models allow the strength of assortative mating to vary (using two 
additional degrees of freedom).  Table 5 shows model fit statistics, including the likelihood-ratio 
χ2 statistic (G2), BIC, and the index of dissimilarity (DI), which measures the proportion of 
observations that must be moved for a model to fit the data perfectly.9  In every case, the null 
effect model fits the data better than the multiplicative effect model according to the BIC 
statistic.  However, BIC penalizes large sample sizes more for each additional degree of freedom 
and, particularly with the large sample size used here, may overvalue simpler models (Powers and 
Xie 2008; Weakliem 1999).  In contrast to BIC, the likelihood-ratio and the index of dissimilarity 
consistently suggest that allowing the strength of assortative mating to vary by compulsory 
category improves model fit.10     
More important for this analysis is how the strength of assortative mating changed with 
the laws.  The φ  parameters measure differences in the strength of individual-spouse association 
by compulsory category.  I present φ  parameters scaled to 1.0, which does not change the model 
(Xie 1992:382), but eases interpretation and comparison across models.  Values higher than 1.0 
indicate stronger association than the non-compulsory group; values lower than 1.0 indicate 
weaker association.  Illustrated in Figure 2, the estimates for all states suggest the compulsory 
laws had minimal effect on assortative mating by education.  If anything, compared to men never 
                                                            
9 For each of these statistics, smaller values indicate better fit of the data. 
10 Based on an increase of two degrees of freedom, the difference in G2 only reaches significance at p<0.05 when 
predicting the distribution by education in the North. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that allowing spousal 
similarity to vary by compulsory category improves model fit. 
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required to attend, those required to attend for up to five years may have experienced slightly 
higher assortative mating by education, while those required to attend longer experienced 
slightly lower homogamy.  Thus, results for all states do not offer a clear answer to hypothesis 
one.   
[Figure 2] 
Comparing results by region, however, yields a clear pattern.  The φ  parameters are 
higher than 1.0 in the North, but lower than 1.0 in the South.  Consistent with hypothesis 2, this 
suggests early compulsory laws reduced educational assortative mating in the less developed 
South, but increased it in the North.   
When interpreting the φ  parameters, only the ratio is of interest not the magnitude (Xie 
1992).  Thus, compared to those never required to attend, spousal educational association in the 
North was 9% stronger among men required to attend school (for either 1-5 years or 6-10 years).  
In contrast, men in the South who were required to attend for 1-5 years had 4% weaker 
educational association with their spouse than those never required to attend.  Educational 
assortative mating was 6% weaker for Southern men required to attend 6-10 years.   
Education results therefore suggest that effects of educational expansion depend on 
context.  Early compulsory laws had no aggregate effect on marital sorting.  Rather, consistent 
with hypothesis two, these early laws increased educational assortative mating in the North, but 
reduced it in the less developed South. 
 
Racial Assortative Mating 
Similar to Table 3 for the educational analyses, Table 6 shows the proportion of men 
married to a spouse of different race by compulsory category and region (illustrated in Figure 1).  
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In all regions and categories, this rate of interracial marriage is less than 1%.  To ease 
interpretation, these figures are multiplied by 10.  Though tiny, the proportion married outside 
their racial group more than doubles from the non-compulsory group to those in either of the 
other two compulsory categories.  Because this pattern of increasing racial exogamy (marriage 
outside one’s social group) is similar among those in the North and the South, it could reflect a 
long-term trend toward increasing interracial marriage.  However, historical analysis reveals that 
the likelihood of interracial marriage actually declined until around 1930 and only increased with 
the decline of Jim Crow laws and the Civil Rights era (Gullickson 2006).  Thus, rising interracial 
marriage with the compulsory laws contradicts the temporal trend.   
[Tables 6 and 7] 
Equivalent to Table 4 in the educational analyses, Table 7 presents a comparison of 
model fit statistics for the racial sorting data.  The distribution by race has only three categories 
and therefore fewer degrees of freedom.  As shown in Table 7, several models are identical and 
therefore fit the data equally well.  The best fitting models (in both the log and log-multiplicative 
models) include quasi-symmetry, the same model used for the education analyses.  Therefore, 
similar to the analysis of educational sorting, I only present log-multiplicative results from the 
quasi-symmetry model of racial sorting.   
Shown in Table 8, results of the log-multiplicative analyses show that BIC does not 
suggest an improvement in model fit when allowing the strength of assortative mating to vary by 
compulsory category.  However, similar to the findings for educational sorting, G2 consistently 
suggests that allowing the strength of racial sorting to vary by compulsory category improves 
model fit.  Based on an increase of two degrees of freedom, the difference in G2 does not reach 
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significance at p<0.05.  Nevertheless, there is some evidence that allowing spousal similarity to 
vary by compulsory category improves model fit.   
Finally, the φ parameters suggest that racial assortative mating remained similar before 
and after the compulsory law when including all states.  However, similar to the pattern for 
education and consistent with hypothesis three, the strength of racial sorting increased in the 
North by 8% for those required to attend 1-5 years and by 4% if required to attend 6-10 years.  In 
the South, however, the strength of racial sorting decreased by 2% (1-5 years required) and 6% 
(6-10 years) compared to those never required to attend.  These differences are illustrated in 
Figure 2.  Overall, results for racial assortative mating are consistent with those for educational 
sorting.   
 
Conclusion 
Improving on past research, this study works to isolate the relationship between 
expansion at the bottom of the educational distribution and assortative mating, net of specific 
year or cohort changes.  By capitalizing on state variation in early compulsory schooling laws, 
this paper separates effects of educational expansion from other cohort changes  At the same 
time, it sets up a strong test of modernization theory by shifting the focus to an early stage of 
U.S. economic development, when Smits and colleagues (1998) suggest educational assortative 
mating was rising.   
Contrary to modernization theory, however, compulsory laws did not consistently 
increase assortative mating by education or reduce it by race.  Rather, results suggest compulsory 
laws had minimal effect on assortative mating at the national level.  Examining results separately 
by region, however, suggests this early instance of educational expansion impacted assortative 
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mating differently depending on context (consistent with hypotheses two and three).  Possibly 
due to regional differences in economic development, educational expansion increased 
assortative mating in the North, but reduced it in the less developed South.  Additional research 
is required to tease apart what aspect of context moderated the effect of educational expansion.  
Furthermore, these results are not definitive, because allowing association to vary by compulsory 
assignment does not improve model fit based on BIC statistics.  However, modeling variation by 
compulsory category improves model fit according to two other measures and reveals a 
consistent pattern. 
Coupled with existing evidence that assortative mating is more complex than 
modernization theory suggests (Smits et al. 1998; Schwartz 2013), results based on the 
alternative method used here suggest more detailed theories are required to understand 
assortative mating.  Complicating modernization theory, results suggest early educational 
expansion impacted both educational and racial homogamy in the same direction, but this 
direction differed by region.  Rather than increasing the importance of education over ascribed 
characteristics such as race, I find that compulsory laws had either an equalizing or an 
unequalizing effect on marital distributions, depending on context.  In the more industrialized 
North, compulsory laws reduced equality of opportunity in the marriage market.  In the more 
agricultural South, the laws increased equality.   
Although results could reflect some other important contextual difference, this pattern is 
consistent with a potentially different role of education depending on economic development.  In 
the more industrialized North, it may have primarily served capitalist interests and reproduced 
inequality (Bowles and Gintis 1976; Spring 1972; Field 1976).  In contrast, educational 
expansion in the South may have encouraged economic development and rationalization (Lutz et 
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al. 2008; Krueger and Lindahl 2001; Barro 2001, 1997), potentially lowering social boundaries 
and increasing equality on the marriage market.  Similarly, results are consistent with the 
possibility that educational expansion countered formal legal and political inequality in the South 
by increasing equality on the marriage market, but reduced marital equality in the North, where 
less formal rules maintained segregation.   
Drastic changes since the period studied make it difficult to generalize results to today.  
For example, declining marriage rates, rising births to unmarried parents, and rising female labor 
force participation are likely to shape the relationship between education and marital patterns.  
Nevertheless, results imply that President Obama’s suggested extension of compulsory 
schooling, which would increase attainment at the bottom of the educational distribution, may 
have little overall effect on assortative mating.  In that case, extended compulsory schooling 
would have little effect on childhood inequality through marriage patterns. 
At the same time, however, expansion could yield heterogeneous effects, increasing 
assortative mating in developed contexts while reducing it in developing contexts.  Similar to 
results of this study, effects of extended compulsory schooling could vary within the U.S.  
Whether due to economic, legal, political, or other differences, findings suggest the marital 
sorting implications of expansion at the bottom of the educational distribution may depend on 
context.  Further research is required to assess whether results generalize to contemporary levels 
of development in the U.S.  If they do, results suggest the laws may reduce assortative mating in 
less developed areas, encouraging partnerships between spouses of different education levels or 
races but also increasing inequalities between families in more and less developed regions.  
Thus, while there are other important potential benefits, this historical evidence suggests 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Std. Dev. Non-Comp Comp 1-5 Comp 6-10 
Education Level (1-5) 3.05 1.15 2.95 3.04 3.15 
Spouse Education Level 3.22 1.16 3.13 3.22 3.31 
Spouse Same Educ Level 0.58 0.49 0.58 0.58 0.56 
Spouse Higher Educ Level 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.27 0.27 
Spouse Lower Educ Level 0.16 0.36 0.15 0.16 0.17 
White 0.87 0.34 0.81 0.88 0.92 
Non-White 0.13 0.34 0.19 0.12 0.08 
Spouse White 0.87 0.34 0.81 0.88 0.92 
Spouse Non-White 0.13 0.34 0.19 0.12 0.08 
Spouse Same Race 1.00 0.06 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Age 49.10 9.90 49.24 48.92 49.13 
Birth Year 1890.90 9.90 1890.76 1891.08 1890.87 
Compulsory 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00 1.00 
N 40697   13606 13461 13630 
Source: 1940 US Census.  
Limited to male household heads age 36-75, married with spouse information, born in the US, and either 5 years 
beyond (Non-Comp = never required to attend) or up to 10 years under the compulsory cutoff (Comp 1-5 = 1-5 





Table 2: Percentage of Observations in Each Education Level 
Education Level Individual Spouse 
1 - None 2.74 1.6 
2 - 1st-7th Grade 38.23 33.27 
3 - 8th Grade 28.51 27.7 
4 - 9th-11th Grade 12.65 16.31 
5 - 12th Grade + 17.87 21.13 
N 40697 40697 





Table 3: Spouse Education by Compulsory Category and Region 





All       
% Same Educ Level 0.58 0.58  0.56 * 
% Lower Educ Level 0.15 0.16  0.17 * 
% Higher Educ Level 0.27 0.27  0.27   
N 13606 13461   13630   
North       
% Same Educ Level 0.53 0.56 * 0.55 * 
% Lower Educ Level 0.18 0.17  0.18   
% Higher Educ Level 0.29 0.27 * 0.27 * 
N 5203 6682   8616   
South       
% Same Educ Level 0.61 0.60 * 0.58 * 
% Lower Educ Level 0.13 0.14 + 0.15 * 
% Higher Educ Level 0.26 0.26  0.27   
N 8403 6779   5014   
Significant difference from the non-compulsory category indicated by * p<0.05, + p<0.1. 





Table 4: Log-Linear Models of Aggregate Education Data – Fit Statistics 
    Deviance df BIC AIC 
% Deviance 
Explained 
Constant   57172.8 24 57,096 2295.1 0% 
Independence 23496.5 16 23,445 948.6 59% 
Row effects 4517.4 12 4,479 189.8 92% 
Row effects, diagonals blocked 94.5 7 72 13.3 100% 
Column effects 3988.2 12 3,950 168.6 93% 
Column effects, diagonals blocked 212.4 7 190 18 100% 
Uniform association 4950.4 15 4,902 206.9 91% 
Uniform assoc, diagonals blocked 375.4 10 343 24.3 99% 
Quasi independence 2931.5 11 2,896 126.4 95% 
Quasi-symmetry 41.1 6 22 11.2 100% 
Crossings   656.4 12 618 35.4 99% 
Crossings, diagonals blocked 195.3 9 166 17.2 100% 
Row-Column effects I 3880.7 9 3,852 164.6 93% 






Table 5: Log-Multiplicative Model Fit Statistics and Phi Parameter Estimates – Education 
  G2 BIC DI df Phi Parameters (scaled to 1) 
ALL         Comp 1-5 yrs Comp 6-10 yrs 
Null Effect 99.0 -304.3 1.4 38     
Multiplicative Effect 96.9 -285.2 1.3 36 1.01 0.98 
            
NORTH           
Null Effect 58.5 -318.8 1.4 38   
Multiplicative Effect 46.4 -311.0 1.2 36 1.09 1.09 
            
SOUTH           
Null Effect 89.0 -287.7 2.0 38   
Multiplicative Effect 83.3 -273.6 1.7 36 0.96 0.94 
G2 = likelihood-ratio χ2 statistic; BIC = Bayesian Information Criteria; DI = index of dissimilarity (the proportion of 
observations that must be moved for a model to fit the data perfectly); df = degrees of freedom. Smaller values 
indicate better fit. 
Phi parameters measure variation in the strength of spousal association compared to the non-compulsory category, 
scaled to 1. Values higher than 1 indicate stronger association than the non-compulsory group; values lower 
than 1 indicate weaker association. 




Table 6: Spouse Race by Compulsory Category and Region 





All       
% Different Race x 10 0.01 0.03 * 0.03 * 
N 13606 13461   13630   
North       
% Different Race x 10 0.01 0.03 * 0.03 * 
N 5203 6682   8616   
South       
% Different Race x 10 0.01 0.02  0.05 * 
N 8403 6779   5014   
Significant difference from the non-compulsory category indicated by * p<0.05, + p<0.1. 
Source: 1940 US Census. Sample is the same as in Table 1. 
Due to small proportions married to a spouse of different race, proportions are multiplied by 10. 
 
 
Table 7: Log-Linear Models of Aggregate Race Data – Fit Statistics 
    Deviance df BIC AIC 
% Deviance 
Explained 
Constant   144323 8 144,306 16042.1 0% 
Independence 31022.8 4 31,014 3454.1 79% 
Row effects 611.3 2 607 75.5 100% 
Column effects 666.7 2 662 81.6 100% 
Uniform association 739.4 3 733 89.5 99% 
Uniform assoc, diagonals blocked 0.54 1 -2 7.8 100% 
Quasi independence 0.54 1 -2 7.8 100% 
Quasi-symmetry 0.54 1 -2 7.8 100% 
Crossings   204 2 200 30.2 100% 
Crossings, diagonals blocked 0.54 1 -2 7.8 100% 
With only 3 categories, race tables provide fewer degrees of freedom. The Row-Column model fails to converge and 
row and column effect models with diagonals blocked become full interaction models and are therefore 
excluded.  df = degrees of freedom 




Table 8: Log-Multiplicative Model Fit Statistics and Phi Parameter Estimates – Race 
  G2 BIC DI df Phi Parameters (scaled to 1) 
ALL         Comp 1-5 yrs Comp 6-10 yrs 
Null Effect 10.1 -85.4 0.0 9   
Multiplicative Effect 9.5 -64.8 0.0 7 1.02 0.99 
            
NORTH           
Null Effect 7.7 -81.6 0.0 9   
Multiplicative Effect 6.5 -63.0 0.0 7 1.08 1.04 
            
SOUTH           
Null Effect 7.8 -81.4 0.1 9   
Multiplicative Effect 6.3 -63.1 0.0 7 0.98 0.94 
G2 = likelihood-ratio χ2 statistic; BIC = Bayesian Information Criteria; DI = index of dissimilarity (the proportion of 
observations that must be moved for a model to fit the data perfectly); df = degrees of freedom. Smaller values 
indicate better fit. 
Phi parameters measure variation in the strength of spousal association compared to the non-compulsory category, 
scaled to 1. Values higher than 1 indicate stronger association than the non-compulsory group; values lower 
than 1 indicate weaker association. 




Figure 1: Spouse Characteristics by Compulsory Category – All States 
 
Based on values in Table 3 for all states.   




Figure 2: Estimates of the Strength of Assortative Mating by Compulsory Category 
 
Based on phi parameter estimates from log-multiplicative models in Table 5.  



































































      
Massachusetts 1852 
District of Columbia 1864 
Vermont 1867 
Michigan, New Hampshire, Washington 1871 
Connecticut, New Mexico 1872 
Nevada 1873 
California, Kansas, New York 1874 




Illinois, Montana, N./S. Dakota, Rhode Island 1883 
Minnesota 1885 
Nebraska, Idaho 1887 
Colorado, Oregon 1889 
Utah 1890 
Pennsylvania 1895 
Hawaii, Kentucky 1896 
Indiana, West Virginia 1897 
Arizona 1899 
Iowa, Maryland 1902 
Missouri, Tennessee 1905 














Table S2: Marital Status of Men Who Would Otherwise Appear in the Sample  
  Mean Std. Dev. 
Married 0.91 0.28 
Widowed 0.04 0.20 
Divorced 0.01 0.09 
Never Married 0.04 0.19 
Compulsory 0.67 0.47 
N 45516 
Source: 1940 US Census.  
Limited to male household heads age 36-75, born in the US, and either 5 years beyond (never required to attend) or 






Table S3: Comparison of Inter-State Migrants and Non-Migrants in Linked Census Data 
Panel A: 1870-1880 IPUMS Linked Representative Sample – Men  
  Non-Migrant Inter-State Migrant   
  Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Difference 
Max SEI Score 22.77 20.81 24.39 21.90 1.62 
Head SEI Score 4.85 12.64 5.90 13.95 1.05 
Max Occup Income Score 20.20 11.76 20.89 12.51 0.69 
Head Occup Income Score 4.76 9.74 5.65 10.53 0.89 
Max Age 45.66 13.12 43.70 12.33 -1.96 
Head Age 19.67 17.08 19.29 15.92 -0.38 
White 0.91 0.29 0.94 0.23 0.04 
Black 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.23 -0.04 
Native American 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Native Parents 0.78 0.41 0.80 0.40 0.02 
Rural 0.84 0.36 0.84 0.36 0.00 
Group Quarters 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.00 
Family Size 6.76 2.41 6.38 2.37 -0.38 
State Comp. School Year 1890.63 17.02 1890.31 15.24 -0.32 
N 54837   5986     
% 0.90   0.10     
 
Panel B: 1880-1900 IPUMS Linked Representative Sample – Men  
  Non-Migrant Inter-State Migrant  
  Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Difference 
Max SEI Score 24.02 20.95 25.56 22.40 1.54 
Head SEI Score 5.92 13.47 6.33 14.48 0.41 
Max Occup. Income Score 20.91 11.46 21.56 12.24 0.65 
Head Occup. Income Score 5.61 10.20 5.82 10.67 0.21 
Max Age 43.97 13.12 43.28 13.24 -0.70 
Head Age 19.69 16.01 17.59 14.68 -2.10 
White 0.95 0.23 0.96 0.20 0.01 
Black 0.05 0.23 0.04 0.20 -0.01 
Native American 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Native Parents 0.71 0.45 0.72 0.45 0.01 
Rural 0.78 0.41 0.80 0.40 0.02 
Group Quarters 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.00 
Family Size 6.29 2.31 6.12 2.36 -0.17 
State Comp. School Year 1889.05 16.66 1889.14 15.91 0.09 
N 32353   6194     
% 0.84   0.16     
Source: IPUMS Linked Representative Samples of Men 1870-1880 and 1880-1900.  
Sample includes individuals living in a household with at least one child under age 14 (i.e. school-age or 
approaching school-age in most states requiring attendance) in the earlier census (1870 in Panel A, 1880 in 
41 
 
Panel B).  All measures are from the earlier census, except inter-state migrant status, which indicates a change 
in state of residence between the first and second census. 
  
Notes: These comparisons are limited to the linked samples of men due to concerns about data quality. Women who 
change their last name at marriage would not be able to be linked from one census to the next.  However, this 
comparison includes all individuals, regardless of gender or whether they are the individual linked between 
censuses. 
Non-Migrant = state of residence is the same in both censuses 
Inter-State Migrant = state of residence changes between the first and second census 
SEI Score = socio-economic index score, sometimes considered occupational status, is based on the median income 
and educational attainment associated with each occupation among men in 1950 
Occup. Income Score = occupational income score measures the median income of men in an occupation in 1950 
State Comp. School Year = the year in which the state of current residence required school attendance for school-
age children 
Max = household maximum value 
 
State of residence during school-age is not available in the 1940 census.  To determine the extent of potential bias 
introduced by determining compulsory assignment based on state of birth, Table S3 shows the prevalence of 
inter-state migration among families with children between 1870 and 1880 (Panel A) and between 1880 and 
1900 (Panel B).  The 1890 census was destroyed by fire and could not be linked.  Table S3 also compares inter-
state migrant and non-migrant families with children on several demographic measures.  While they cannot rule 
it out, these comparisons are consistent with limited potential bias due to selective migration.  While most of the 
differences between migrant and non-migrant measures are small, but statistically significant, the difference in 
state compulsory school year is not significant in either Panel A or B.  This suggests inter-state migration 
among families with children is independent of the timing of state compulsory schooling laws.   
